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Ladies and gentlemen.  
The mood of this talk is entirely James Lovelock’s fault. In his latest book, The Revenge 
of Gaia, Lovelock —apparently a kind, decent, serious, wholly pacific scientist—, 
transports his readers into the midst of a front line of terrifying intensity.1 And yet, he is 
not talking about one of those antiquated wars that so many humans wage against one 
another, but of another war, the one that humans, as a whole, wage, without any explicit 
declaration, against Gaia.  
As you all know, I am sure, “Gaia” is the mythical name that Lovelock has given to 
the life support systems of our planet. In spite of the goddess’s name, Lovelock knows fully 
well that “she” is not a person, not even an organism, but the emergent property of all the 
feedback mechanisms that, on the whole, have balanced themselves well enough over the 
last billion years to maintain life on Earth inside some fluctuating albeit restricted limits. 
What he shows, chapter after chapter in his book, is that those limits have been trespassed 
by our own human collective action to such a point that all the feedback mechanisms are 
now oriented in the same direction: there are no longer any negative mechanisms able to 
balance the self-reinforcing positive ones.  
This is why he derides the timid ecologist who promotes “sustainable development” as 
a solution. Lovelock mocks the ecologist’s naiveté and uses an alternative metaphor that is 
especially telling to all of the British: the human race is in such a state of urgency that it is 
like a defeated army stranded on the beaches of Dunkirk! “Hasty retreat” is the name 
Lovelock gives to what will have to  happen on the front line if we were ever to be held up 
in a June 1940 of truly global proportion. Speak of a World War… Those of the 20th 
century were little provincial conflicts compared to the one that awaits us. Retreat, 
retreat! before it’s too late and we lose everything.  
We will lose especially because this war against Gaia has one trait in common with 
that rather local fight ridiculously called the “War on Terror”: it cannot be won. Either 
we come out on top of Gaia, and we disappear with her; or we lose against Gaia, and she 
manages to shudder us out of existence. Now that’s “terror” for real, and I am not greatly 
                                                       
1 Lovelock, James. The Revenge of Gaia: Earth's Climate Crisis and the Fate of Humanity. Basic Books, 
New York, 2006. 
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reassured when Lovelock punctuates his pedestrian and yet hair-raising prose from time 
to time, with a few half-hearted “I hope I am wrong”… Well I hope so too..  
The reason why I have been so unsettled by Lovelock’s book is not because it has been 
continuously reinforced and documented by every new meeting of the various 
international Committees on Global Warming, but rather because there is a utterly 
mysterious hole in the book that Lovelock, this kindly gentleman, does not even bother to 
point out: in 2050, he says (and that’s tomorrow, really), civilization will have disappeared 
(not, mind you, the human race, there will be scattered people in Kamtchatka and Terra 
de Fuego, although, by the way, not much of British Isles will be left…). Disappeared, that 
is, if Gaia does not succeed in obtaining a cool planet from us with only five hundred 
million humans. Yes, you heard me, that’s what he says: “500 millions”, and by then, if 
projections are right, we should be well over 9 billion. Now, that’s quite a retreat to ask 
for and in less than 50 years! Nowhere in the book, however, does Lovelock bother to 
explain how we could possibly manage to move from one figure to the other. Nowhere 
does he mention that the crimes of the 21st century might have to be at least one order of 
magnitude greater than those of the 20th century… He quietly, and almost absent-mindedly 
implies it. That’s what I found so terrifying. How can we protect our collective existence 
either against a War on Gaia that we have no way of winning, or against committing 
crimes over fellow humans of such mind-boggling magnitude?  
 
Don’t worry: I have no intention of adding another gloomy prognosis to those we read 
everyday in the newspapers. I am not going to play the prophet of doom by telling you 
the precise moment when this very place in the East part of London Docklands will be 
put under deep water… The reason why I start with Lovelock’s call for a new Retreat of 
Dunkirk, is that I think the ecological crisis entirely transforms the question that has been 
raised for this annual meeting. I quote: “social connections: identities, technologies and 
relationships”.  
Even if you don’t share the gloomy prognosis of Jared Diamond, Lovelock and so 
many other authors, you might agree that embarking on a “world war” makes an 
enormous difference to what counts as “social connections”. 
How can we read in the newspapers that “we” as humans might be responsible for 30 
or 40% of species extinction, without this effecting a change in our “identity” and our 
“relationships”? How can we remain unmoved by the idea that we are now as dangerous 
to our life support system as the impact of a major meteorite? How can we have the same 
definition of ourselves, now that all the terms which earlier were metaphorical (terms like 
“upheavals”, “tectonic shift”, and “revolutions”) have become literal: yes indeed, 
collectively we are just as powerful as what caused three or four other mass extinctions —
and some scientists use the word Anthropocene to describe this new geological era. Do 
you feel proud of that? Some might, actually: so big, so mighty! But how can this feeling 
be reconciled with the opposite one: we are so little, so powerless, a mere scratch on the 
surface of the Earth? How could we be capable of war crimes of such proportion and yet 
so absolutely despondent? “I did nothing, I followed the orders”. Is this discrepancy – 
between the immensely big and powerful, and the immensely weak and puny – not one of 
the reasons why we keep reading all of this literature on ecological crisis without really 
believing in it?  
 
To begin to address the theme proposed by the organizers of this annual meeting, it 
seems to me that we have to redefine the collective “we” that is the new focus of the social 
sciences (I will redefine the word “social” in a minute). 
 The great German thinker, Peter Sloterdijk, has proposed that history was never 
about “modernization” or about “revolution”, but was rather about another 
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phenomenon, that he names “explicitation”.2 As we moved on, through our technologies, 
through our scientific inquiries, through the extension of our global empires, we rendered 
more and more explicit the fragility of the life support systems that make our “spheres of 
existence” possible (“sphere” is the theme of Sloterdijk’s three volume magnum opus 
unfortunately not yet translated into English).  
Everything that earlier was merely “given” becomes “explicit”. Air, water, land, all of 
those were present before in the background: now they are explicitated because we slowly 
come to realize that they might disappear —and we with them. In another war metaphor 
taken this time, not from the Beach of Dunkirk but from the terrifying day in 1917 in the 
trenches of Ypres, Sloterdijk sees the symbol of the times: suddenly, as the greenish cloud 
of toxic gas migrated from the German side, British soldiers began to suffocate and die. 
Air, the air we always took for granted even through the horrors of the trenches, was 
suddenly lacking, air was thus explicitated in the most terrifying way. It could no longer be 
taken for granted, it entered the spheres of existence as one of their “air conditions” 
(another of Sloterdijk’s obsessions). From the implicit, it became explicit. 
 
“What has this to do”, you could object, “with the topic of the social sciences? No 
matter how you define what humans do, sociologists can still study their shifting 
‘identities’, their moving ‘technologies’, their newly formed ‘relationships’. ‘Social 
connections’ will always be ‘social connections’.” 
Not necessarily, and this is where I want to enter more deeply —and may be too 
polemically— into the topic: the whole idea of “social connections” was linked to a 
moment in history, that of modernization and of emancipation. What happens if we have 
shifted to another period, one of explicitation and of attachments?  
Since “we have never been modern”, we have always been living through a completely 
different history than the one we kept telling ourselves about: until the ecological crisis 
began to strike hard and tough, we could go on as though “we” humans were living 
through one modernization after another, jumping from one emancipation to the next. 
After all, the future was one of greater and greater detachment from all sorts of 
contingencies and cumbersome ties. Free at last! 
What happens to our identities, if it finally dawns on us that that very same history 
always had another meaning: the slow explicitation of all of the attachments necessary for 
the sustenance of our fragile spheres of existence? What happens if the very definition of 
the future has changed? If we now move from the taken into account of a few beings, to the 
weaving of careful attachments with an ever greater and greater list of explicitated beings? 
Attached at last! Dependent! Responsible! 
Is it at all imaginable that the “social sciences” could have the same agenda, the same 
methods, the same calling, in both cases?  
If modernization was for humans, explicitation is for… for whom? what would be a 
good name? “Post-human” will not do, but why not using that word that science-fiction 
writers have used all along, yes that of Earthlings? After all, if Lovelock is even one bit 
right, it’s fitting to call those who have waged wars on Gaia, Earthlings.  
What I am saying, to put it too bluntly, is that while we might have had social sciences 
for modernizing and emancipating humans, we have not the faintest idea of what sort of 
social science is needed for Earthlings buried in the task of explicitating their newly 
discovered attachments. If modernization has been a parenthesis, for what happens next 
we are being sent back to the design table. I surmise that’s why we have been assembled 
here today. 
 
                                                       
2 Sloterdijk, Peter. Sphären Iii- Schäume. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 2004. 
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But how can we equip the social sciences for this radical new task? You will not be 
surprised, if I claim that one of the problems lies with the notion of “social connections” 
that lies in the very title of our gathering. If it is true that a word gets its meaning by 
opposition to other words, what is the opposite of “social” in that expression? I am not 
completely sure that we will agree on the definition, but likely candidates must be 
something like “non-social”, “natural”, “material”, “economic”, maybe “biological” or 
“psychological”. In most of the social sciences, as they have been developed during the 
modernist parenthesis, the word “social” was put in charge of gathering whatever was not 
already firmly fixed and cultivated by the other higher, older, harder disciplines. To speak 
of “social connections” is thus inevitably followed by the sequel: “social” “by opposition” or 
“by contrast” to other types of connections. “Not only” legal, but also “social”; “not only” 
psychological” but also “social”; and so on. 
 Naturally, this division among connections was not a problem when we were busy 
modernizing our societies —or rather while we believed ourselves to be doing so— but it 
becomes a major hindrance once we try to shift our efforts toward the explicitation of the 
many attachments that we have to weave together simultaneously. A hindrance for one 
good reason: while “social” was useful for focusing on one type of area among several others 
left in the hands of other specialized domains, the social is completely useless for tracing 
what should now be common to the other types of domains. In other words, “social” might 
throw light on the “social”, but that’s all, when what we now need is a type of connection 
that sheds light on all of the other types of connections as well.  
This is why, many years ago, I proposed that we shift the definition of sociology from 
the study of “social” connections to the study of “associations” —keeping the same Latin 
etymology but refusing to limit the inquiries to one domain only, as if, side by side, we 
had “social”, “psychological”, “legal”, “biological” and “economic” connections, each 
with its own science and protocols.  
There are clearly two meanings (at least) of the word “social”: the first, social n°1, that 
is taken to be a domain among others non-social ones; the second, social n°2, that 
establishes connections, associations, collections, whatever the name, between all sort of 
heterogeneous domains, none of them being “social” in the first meaning of the word. To 
sum up the contribution of “actor-network-theory”: social is not the name of any one link 
in a chain, nor even that of the chain, but it is that of the chaining itself. A laboratory 
discovery, a piece of technology, a work of art, indeed a living being such as Michel 
Callon’s famous scallops, are not social in the first meaning of the word, but they are 
social in the second one, whenever they deeply modify (or translate) what they are tied to.  
If I now consider reconsider the theme of this meeting, you will agree that it takes two 
entirely different directions depending on how we understand “social connections”. If it’s 
social number one, we should concentrate on the social domain and leave the others to 
specialists; if it’s social number two, our paramount duty is to understand how these 
domains might reconnect.  
 
I need no other proof to show that this is not a new debate other than the fierce 
dispute that Durkheim had with his predecessor Gabriel Tarde, more than a century ago. 
As it is becoming now well known, Tarde was constantly complaining that Durkheim kept 
messing up causes and consequences. While the collective —my word— was made up of 
legal, religious, technical, scientific connections, Durkheim, Tarde complained, kept 
trying to “explain” all of those connections by the fact that they were in essence social —
that is, social n°1.  
Religious ties where not due to religion, in spite of its venerable etymology, but to the 
diffracted presence of Society above the praying souls. Legal ties where not due to law 
itself, but again to the underlying weight that Society gave to the relationships. And the 
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same was true, for Durkheim, according to Tarde, for every other activity —economic, 
spiritual, artistic, political or psychological. The social realm was what gave solidity, 
durability and consistency to domains like religion, law, economy, psychology that could 
not hold by themselves —nature being of course the only exception.  
For Tarde, on the other hand, such reasoning was just a complete fallacy: society is 
nothing but the empty word we use for the superposition of all of the heterogeneous 
connections produced by non-social elements like law, biology, economy, politics, physics 
etc. Social (n°1) explains nothing, not even itself; on the contrary: it has to be explained. 
The duty of sociologists is not to limit themselves to the social connections or, even more 
absurdly, to explain away the other domains by pretending that, in essence, they are 
made of social ties, but to follow through which associations so many non-social ties are 
brought together to form a durable —and maybe livable— whole. 
Naturally, this dispute between Tarde and Durkheim was entirely buried (actually no 
one mentioned it before a few of us resurrected it a few years ago…), buried, that is, until 
the development of science studies gave it a completely new import.  
As it has been by now well exemplified, the “social” n°1, during the modernizing 
period, was nothing more than the second half of a division, the other half being, of 
course, the “natural”. If sociologists had been so complacent about the meaning of 
“social” in the expression “social connections”, it’s because (as science students began to 
realize), they had quite consciously delegated to the harder sciences the task of dealing 
with the really really hard causal connections: the ones that obtained between non-
humans. Science and technology on the one hand, social connections on the other. But 
when science studies began to try to provide a “social explanation” of science and 
technology, that is of causal relations, the whole divide went awry. This is what I call, 
using my Christian upbringing (and in the true spirit of Easter!), the Felix culpa of science 
studies: by failing to give a social explanation of science and technology, we got rid of 
social connections altogether… 
But even this good riddance would have remained a curiosity inside of our tiny sub-
discipline of STS, without the ecological crisis: suddenly, at a gigantic scale and speed, 
every single element of the former “nature” or the former “society” began to crumble 
down. Such is the amazing transformation to which we have had the good fortune of 
bearing witness. Every one, it seems, has become a practitioner of science studies! 
While thirty years ago, it took sociologists and historians of science and technology 
enormous efforts to associate a given matter of fact to the human groups responsible for 
its coming into existence, it seems nowadays that there is hardly a matter of fact left 
without its associated constituency. Have you noticed it? every disease now has its patient 
organization, every river its advocacy group, every Swiss glacier, it seems, its protective 
cover, every bird, every tree, its own group of volunteers and militants —it is as if every 
bug had its blog! When last year astronomers turned lexicographers modified the list of 
planets in good standing, that too made the headlines —and some planetoids had their 
vociferous defenders! I have learned recently that even nettle, this real nuisance of my 
garden, benefits from a group caring for it and trying to redress what they see as sheer 
plant discrimination! Nettle?!  
To qualify such a sea change, this fast disappearance of “nature” & “society”, I have 
proposed to say that all matters of fact have become matters of concern —or, more 
philosophically, that objects have become things that is, issues, gatherings, assemblies of 
some sort. Whatever the name, one consequence is sure: this is the new turf of the newly 
redefined social sciences. The ecological crisis has forced us to abandon the nature and 
society collectors, reinforcing to a degree none of us thought imaginable, I swear, the 
feeble insights of early science studies. 
 
102-B-Latour BSA-Meeting  6      
 
Now this is the hard part: the demise of the “society”/”nature” divide, what I had 
called the Modernist Constitution, is only, so to speak, a negative event: we are finally freed 
from a narrative that never accurately described what happened during the global 
expansion of humans anyway. The “society”/”nature” divide  says nothing at all about 
what really happened. We are still struggling to find a positive narrative, one fitting for the 
newly redefined Earthlings. To be sure, we now know that social (n°2) is the name of the 
whole chaining and not of any of its link, but that’s not a great advance. The collective 
(my word for the former “society” slash “nature”) still has to be assembled. 
If the world is not made of either nature or society or any combination thereof, what is 
it made of? 
Back to Tarde, or rather to ANT: take for instance the law (Tarde by the way was 
been a judge most of his career). Forget about explaining the solidity of legal ties by 
appealing to some extraneous force, for instance society itself. Follow in details, for 
instance in a court of law, as I have done with the French Conseil d’Etat, or as Mike Lynch 
and his colleagues has done with DNA fingerprinting, the sort of objectivity it provides 
between scattered elements: common sense reasoning, results from instruments, 
precedents, legal documents, signatures, etc.3 If you do this, you might end up focusing on 
a type of connector that is not social (social n°1) to be sure, but that does connect in a 
thoroughly original way. Whenever we sign our name at the bottom of a document, we 
link words and deeds through a type of attachment that is typical of legal connection. 
Whenever a lawyer tries out possible gaps in the “chain of custody” that guarantees, 
through many layers of paper works, that a DNA sample pertains indeed to this or that 
suspect, we witness a sort of objectivity that deserves to be treated with extreme care, and 
not explained (that is, explained away) by saying that, if its strong and durable, it means 
that social forces have taken over. No, it’s just the opposite: a large part of what we mean 
by being “socially durable” is to be tied by that sort of fragile and yet wholly original legal 
ties: I am responsible for what I have done, precedents carry some weight, the law binds. 
It does not bind socially, it binds legally. 
The same is true, as is well known now through the efforts of the STS community, if, 
instead of to law, we were paying attention to techniques. Techniques don’t form a cold 
domain of material relations wholly divorced from the rest of the collective. It does not 
form an infrastructure under our feet nor is it a mere background for the exercise of our 
freedom. If you take the example of the container so beautifully studied by Marc 
Levinson, it becomes very quickly clear that a large part of what we mean by “global” 
depends on the invention of that box.4 To use the title of this book, the container is “the 
box that made the world smaller and the world economy bigger”. But nowhere in the 
book do you have a technique on the one hand, and a society on the other. And for one 
good reason: the container is entirely a logistical invention with a very few “harder” parts 
—like the cranes or the holding gears. The spread of the container depends just as much 
on legal litigation, accounting procedures, ship design, labor relations among dock 
workers unions, harbor redevelopment, and so on. In other words, whenever a technology 
is considered, it becomes an assemblage of complex heterogeneous threads. And yet, there 
is a type of connection that can truly be called technical: that is when non-humans are 
brought in, aligned and black-boxed in such a way that they provide some sort of durable 
objectivity. This is why it’s so moot to try to provide a social explanation (still social n°1) 
                                                       
3 Lynch, Michael, Simon A. Cole, Ruth McNally, and Kathleen Jordan. Truth Machine: The 
Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008. 
4 Levinson, Marc. The Box. How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World 
Economy Bigger. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006. 
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of the spread of a technique, since a large part of what is meant by being durably 
associated is made, in the first place, by the weaving of those very technical ties.  
And I could have multiplied the examples, by taking, for instance, science or religion, 
or art, or politics. Each of those words designate specific modes of connection that cannot 
be explained by the other. If you had the patience to listen to the last two cases, law and 
technique, you will have noticed that I ended up each case with the same lesson: the 
durability of the associations is due to the ways laws and techniques connect. It’s not 
because they are social that they last, but because the collective relies in part on the legal 
and technical ways to form a durable sphere. In a way, this is not surprising since (at least 
according to ANT) society, or rather the collective, is the consequence of all the different 
types of association —and not its cause.  
 
All the same, it’s a great weakness for a theory to claim that every mode of connection 
is specific, while at the same time not being able to say in what way each mode differs from 
the others. This is the problem I have always had with actor-network-theory, or indeed 
with good old Tarde: they offer extremely efficient ways to get rid of the social (social 
n°1), but of every single association they simply say that they associate… Even if it is nice 
to study at last the whole chain and not only one of its rings or links, it’s disappointing not 
to be able to say anything about the composition of that chain. This is why I often 
compare ANT to a withdrawal cure: it’s very good to clean your blood stream from 
centuries of addiction to social explanation, but it does not sustain you; it’s a negative, not 
a substantive argument. You are cleaned from the bad dope of the social to be sure, but 
you are not yet healthily fed… 
This is why in the few minutes left, I want to try to push the argument further: the 
social sciences have a true object which is not the social per se (social n°1), but the shifting 
attachments offered by various non-social modes of connections.  
If this sounds obscure, consider the collective as a sort of game of building Legos, but 
whereas Lego bricks have only one type of connection (the four peg standard), imagine 
that there are several types of connectors. The bricks have many shapes and they are all 
of many bright colors, but what attaches them can differ. Now, suppose we call one of 
those attachments, the legal one, another the technical one, still another the religious one, 
yet another the scientific one, the political and so on. Then, begin to build the collective 
out of those heterogeneous bricks using several of those various bonds —to use also a 
chemical metaphor. When bricks are connected through legal ties, they spread in a 
fashion that is highly specific and that possesses its own solidity, even though the bricks 
come from all over the place. Same thing, when it’s the mode of connection of religion or 
politics or science that is used to relate heterogeneous building blocks.  
The point of this somewhat clumsy metaphor is not to draw various spheres of activity, 
as Luhmann has tried to do, each of them with its own homogeneity, one being the legal 
sphere, the other the scientific sphere, a third one the technical sphere, and so on. 
Institutions are much too heterogeneous to be assembled in a Luhmannian way, side by 
side. And yet, there is something deeply right in Luhmann’s attempt to save the social 
from social explanation: it’s totally impossible to assemble a collective made only of social 
(social n°1) ties. This does not mean that it’s a system made of sub-systems —there are no 
systems and no sub-systems—, but it does mean that modes of connection are indeed 
different and that it’s utterly moot to account for the legal by using the technical, or the 
religious by the scientific, or the artistic by the economic, etc. Each modes of connection 
has its own way of spreading, its own epidemiology, if you wish, its own contagion, its 
own objectivity, its own solidity.  
What I am really saying is that, whereas there is no independent domain of science, 
technique, law, religion, etc, it makes a huge, a lasting, an enormous difference whether a 
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connection is made legally, scientifically, religiously, artistically, politically or technically. 
It’s the adverb that designates a really major ontological nuance even though there is no 
such a thing as a substantive definition to be given: politics is not a domain, it’s a type of 
relation. The whole attention should shift to the modes of connections, or “modes of 
existence”. In that sense, the early intuition of ANT was right: it’s just that actor-network-
theory is a black and white rendering of associations (social n°2), when what is needed is a 
fully colorized version. 
The argument is not as far fetched as it may seem, because it’s exactly the one 
proposed, (like those of Tarde at the beginning of the former century), by William James 
under the label of radical empiricism.5 By reminding you of his argument, I will bring this 
lecture to a close and reconnect with the ecological crisis I started from.  
 
What I want to say is that the problem with the social sciences is that they are not 
empirical enough, just at the time in history when they are most needed to redesign the 
whole spheres of existence from top to bottom. Or rather, they have inherited a very 
narrow definition of empiricism, what I call first empiricism. What’s the difference with the 
second empiricism, the one that James called “radical”? Precisely: relations, or 
connections, that is precisely those modes of connections, or modes of existence that are 
not depending on the divide, on the bifurcation, between, natural and social.  
I am saying this with some trepidation, because I know that empiricism was invented 
in this country, in England and Scotland, a few centuries ago and that it’s impossible to 
convince a Brit that it was a historical invention and not the true bedrock expression of 
what the world is “really like”: middle sized dry goods on the one hand, on top of which 
you might wish to throw some symbols or social connections. In the eyes of the Brits, you 
have to be a French to deny that this not the real state of affairs. And yet, I will rub it in: 
first empiricism has been limiting experience to an amazingly poor repertoire of 
connections: the world provided sensory inputs and all of the relations had to come from 
the human mind. I quote James: 
"I will say nothing here of the persistent ambiguity of relations. They are undeniable parts of pure 
experience; yet, while common sense and what I call radical empiricism stand for their being objective, 
both rationalism and the usual empiricism claim that they are exclusively the 'work of the mind' -the 
finite mind or the absolute mind, as the case may be". (Essays in Radical Empiricism, p.148-149) 
The social sciences to be sure have managed since the 17th century to socialize 
somewhat the “work of the mind” so that it is now cultures, societies, norms, and no 
longer individual heads that are in charge of molding sensory data into shapes. And yet, 
just as in the time of Locke or of Hume, social scientists never managed to realize again 
that relations too are given into experience. For reasons that are due to the Modernist settlement, 
the social sciences, as a rule, accepted to limit experience to the incredibly narrow 
confines of objects without relations. What a pity. As James so nicely said: 
"Prepositions, copulas, and conjunctions, 'is', 'isn't', 'then', 'before', 'in', 'on', 'beside', 'between', 
'next', 'like', 'unlike', 'as', 'but', flower out of the stream of pure experience, the stream of concretes or 
the sensational stream, as naturally as nouns and adjectives do, and they melt into it as fluidly when 
apply them to a new portion of the stream". (idem p 95) 
What James is saying in effect is that if it might be about time to be empirical at last, 
that is to add nothing to experience, to be sure, but not to withdraw anything from 
experience either, especially not connections! Conjunctions! Prepositions! The very stuff 
out of which experience is woven! Unfortunately, first empiricism, has done just that, 
                                                       
5 James, William. Essays in Radical Empiricism. University of Nebraska Press, London, 1996 
[1907]. 
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depriving first, modernist philosophy,  and then later the modernizing social sciences, of 
any chance of being faithful to what is given in experience.  
 
I will close this lecture with a strange paradox: never was the need for radical social 
sciences more pressing than it is today, and yet this is just the time when the lines of 
columnists in the Western world, especially in France, are complaining about the 
abandonment of “utopian ideals”, the demise of “revolutionary impulses”, the fall back 
into complacency, the final victory of neo-liberalism; this is just the time when the task 
that lies ahead is not only “revolutionary” but of truly “earth-shaking proportion” —and 
remember, all of those expressions are now literal not metaphorical. We have managed to 
shake the Earth out of balance for good!  
Think of it: what was the storming of the Winter Palace, compared to the total 
transformation of our landscape, cities, factories, transportation system for which we will 
have to gird ourselves after the Oil Peak? How ridiculously timid does Karl Marx’s 
preoccupation with the mere “appropriation of means of production” seem, when compared 
against the total metamorphosis of the entire means of production necessary to soon adjust 
nine Billion people on a livable planet Earth? Every product, every biological species, 
every packaging, every consumer in excruciating detail is concerned in this, together with 
every river, every glaciers, and every bug —even the earthworms have to be brought in 
according to a recent article in the New Scientist! We knew about Darwin’s work on 
earthworms, but where could you find, before today, a Marxist view of earthworms? I 
know Marx’s salutation: “Well done, old mole”, yes, but, as far as I know, he never said 
“Be careful with earthworms!”.  
It’s now painfully clear that communism was never more than capitalism’s abundance 
pushed to the limit. How unimaginative was such an idea, compared to the modification 
of all the sinews and corridors of what abundance and wealth should be, from now on! 
Which communist could think that the day would come when they would have to devise a 
politics for the Gulf Stream? The Gulf Stream, for Goodness sake! And yet it might fail 
you (and then this place in London will be under water and probably frozen too!). Yet this 
is just the time when activists and politicians, pundits and intellectuals, continue to 
complain about the “ends of utopias” and the disappearance of “les maîtres penseurs”… 
No wonder, the travails of explicitation have nothing in common with the naïve 
dreams of emancipation. But they are radical nonetheless, they are our future 
nonetheless. Don’t fool yourselves: explicitation is a much tougher task than the “business 
as usual” of the modernizing revolutionaries. There are more Third Ways than even New 
Labor and Tony Giddens could ever envisage… 
Who are you really, Earthlings, to believe that you are the ones adding relations by the 
sheer symbolic order of your mind, by the projective power of your brain, by the sheer 
intensity of your social schemes, to a world entirely devoid of meaning, of relations, of 
connections?! Where have you lived until now? Oh I know, you have lived into this 
strange modernist utterly archaic globe; and suddenly under crisis you realize that all 
along you have been inhabiting the Earth. It’s as if you had changed space and time, past, 
present and future. Can we reequip our disciplines so that they meet the challenge? If 
Lovelock is right, to try to prove it we have a tiny window of opportunity, less than forty 
three years to go… So now let’s get on with the social, I mean the earthly sciences. 
Thank you. 
 
 
